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CHAPTER I 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Many human interactions are characterized by efforts to interact 
with someone for a specific goal. Those interactions wluch involve a 
1 highly conscious goal have been termed goal-oriented relationslnps. 
Goal-oriented social relationships are necessary when each of us cannot 
achieve our desired goals alone. 
Cooperative, Competitive, and Mixed-motive Goal Relationslnps 
Goal-oriented relationships vary in the degree of cooperation and 
competition inherent in the particular relationship. Cooperative 
relationships, competitive relationships, and mixed-motive relation-
2 ships are three classifications of goal-oriented social relationships. 
These classifications are based on the amount of cooperation associated 
with the relationship. 
A cooperative relationship occurs when all participants derive 
maximum benefits from the same outcome or the same decision. Since 
each participant derives Ins maximum benefit from the same outcome, 
each participant decides on and helps to bring about that outcome. 
An example might be two people working together to write a book. 
/ 
They both would probably want the outcome of a scholarly, 1nforn1.1t1vc, 
and widely read book. They both would probably work toward this outcome. 
1 
A competitive relationship occurs when outcomes favorable to one 
participant are distinctly unfavorable to the other participant(s). 
This condition would describe a win or lose situation An example 
might be two book salesmen competitively trying to "win a book adop-
tion for a basic course at a university." Here if one salesman 
achieves his goal the other salesman cannot achieve lns. 
A mixed-motive relat1onsh1p includes motives to coopc1ntc nnd 
motives to compete. Mixed-motive situations are cooperative in the 
sense that if a decision can be negotiated, the resulting outcome 
is rewarding to some degree to all participants. However, such inter-
actions are also competitive since the particular decision and outcome 
most rewarding to one party is not the most rewarding to the other 
party. Mixed-motive situations offer a set of mutually benef1c1al 
alternatives, however some decisions are more beneficial to one parti-
cipant at the expense of the other part1cipant(s). An example of a 
mixed-motive situation might be the negotiation between a publ1sl11ng 
company and a writer about the financial and other benefits to be 
given the writer for his book. 
Most goal-oriented social relationships are mixed-motive Ex-
changes of resources are mixed-motive. All economic bargaining is 
m1xed-mot1ve. The buyer and seller must agree on a sale 1f either 1s 
to benefit. (Tlns represents the mot1 ve for cooperation.) Yet, the 
decision on price and quantity paranieters 1s compet1 t1ve. The more 
the seller benefits from a spec1f1c agreement on price and quantity, 
the less the buyer benefits from the transaction. 
2 
3 
Bilateral Monopoly Bargaining 
This study examines a specific type of mixed-motive goal rela-
tionships--economic bargaining. Even more specifically it examines 
that type of economic bargaining known as bilateral monopoly bargaining. 
Bilateral monopolies describe those instances of economic bargaining 
where there is only one buyer and one seller presently engaged 1n the 
negotiation of price and quantity parameters. 
It has been pointed out by Siegel and Fouraker that many social 
conflict situations show the same basic characteristics of the bila-
teral monopoly situation. "There has been a recent revival of interest 
in bilateral monopoly, because the bare structure of the situation 
has the essential characteristics of many social conflict s1 tuations. 113 
Siegel and Fouraker believe, and this writer concurs, that knowledge 
about bilateral monopoly negotiation can be a basis for understanding 
the bare structure of many mixed-motive goal relationships. 
Certainly many variables affect mixed-motive relationships. The 
personalities of the people involved 1n the mixed-m?tive situation, 
their self-concepts, their perceptions of each other, their compatibi-
h.ty or incompatibility, their attitudes toward bargaining, and their 
styles of communication may well be important in understanding mixed-
motive situations However, these variables are not as basic to the 
mixed-motive situation as the fundamental aspect of mL\.ed-motive 
situations. The fundamental question of mixed-motive situations is 
"How can cooperative interests and competitive interests be merged 
in the form of an agreement?" This is the general structure to wlnch 
the specific individual variations of personality differences, 
commnnication style differences, and the other less fundamental 
variable differences must be added. 
Bilateral bargaining highlights tlns basic structure of both 
competitive and cooperative motives. If the essential characteristic 
of mixed-motive situations is the existence of both cooperative and 
competitive motives, and if bilateral bargaining highlights this basic 
structure rather than other aspects of m1.xcd-motive s1tuat1ons, then 
bilateral bargaining is a basic starting point towards examining 
mixed-motive situations 
As we have stated, all economic bargaining is mixed-motive. In 
bilateral monopoly negotiation the cooperative motives are expressed 
when both the buyer and the seller strive to maximize their Joint 
payoff. Wi thrn the set of possible agreements on price and quantity, 
4 
each price and quantity agreement has payoffs for the buyer and payoffs 
for the seller. The Joint payoff is the sum of the buyer's payoff and 
the seller's payoff for a particular price and quantity agreement 
Differential payoff is the division of the Joint payoff between 
the seller and the buyer. The competitive aspect of bilateral bargaining 
situations is reflected in these individual payoffs 
Utility Value Knowledge Effects 
The main question of tlns study is developed from the context of 
bilateral bargaining studies. The central question is "What effect 
does knowledge or lack of knowledge of one's bargaining partner's 
possible payoffs have both on one's own payoffs and on Joint payoff 
maximization?" The question implies that knowing or not knowing one's 
fellow negotiator's utility values affects both differential and 
Joint payoff. 
Utility Value Knowledge and Joint Payoff 
The evidence suggests that Joint payoff is more easily maximized 
when utility value knowledge is complete. Siegel and Fouraker used 
three levels of completeness or payoff knowledge one where both bar-
gainers had complete payoff information, one where neither bargainer 
had complete payoff information, and one where one bargainer had 
complete payoff information and the other bargainer had incomplete 
5 
4 payoff information. Bargaining pairs where one bargainer had complete 
payoff information achieved a significantly higher mean Joint payoff 
than bargaining pairs where neither bargainer had complete payoff 
information. Also, bargaining pairs where both bargainers had complete 
payoff information achieved a significantly higher mean Joint payoff 
than either of the other two conditions where at least one bargainer 
had incomplete payoff information 
Kahn and Kohls (1972) studied bargaining pairs where either both 
bargainers had either incomplete information or both bargainers had 
complete information. The complete information pairs tended to achieve 
a higher Joint payoff, however, the difference in means was not statis-
tically significant. In the research of Harnett et al (1968) mean 
Joint payoff was also not s1gn1£icantly different. Trios where all 
barga1.ners had complete information aclneved a nearly equal mean payoff 
to that of trios where two or all three of the bargainers had incomplete 
information. 
There is limited research on the effect of completeness of infor-
mation on Joint payoff. However, from the statistically nonsign1ficant 
6 
results of Siegel and Fouraker, it appears that as both bargainers 
approach complete payoff information, a lugher Joint payoff is aclueved. 
The central question of the study is important in terms of 
differential payoff effects because knowing one's opponent's utill ty 
values for alternative agreements should theoretically have two 
important effects. First, knowledge of one's opponent's utility values 
affects one's expected payoff Secondly, complete information of 
5 utility functions affects what Fellner calls "one's bargaining strength" 
Payoff Expectations 
Siegel and Fouraker have demonstrated that in bilateral bargaining 
where both bargainers have complete information (knowledge of the Joint 
payoffs and the division of payoffs associated with any proposed con-
6 tract) the expectations of payoffs seem to be realistic. This assump-
tion was supported by the observation that bargainers who both had 
complete information made more modest (that is more compromising) initial 
offers than incomplete information bargainers. Although expectations 
of payoffs were not actually measured by Siegel and Fouraker, they were 
assumed to be the reason for the }ugh incidence of fifty-fifty spll ts 
of the Joint payoff when bargainers had complete 1nfonnation about each 
other's payoffs. Tlus tendency toward fifty-fifty spll ts wc1.s not found 
as frequently when one bargainer or both bargainers lacked knowledge of 
both bargainer's util1 ty functions. Thus, Siegel and Fouraker demon-
strated that complete payoff knowledge seems to result in realistic 
payoff expectations which lead to more fifty-fifty splits rather than 
widely variant differential payoffs. 
The implication of this Siegel and Fouraker finding is that 1f 
7 
neither bargainer or only one bargainer has complete payoff knowledge, 
there will be a tendency toward differential payoff inequalities. This 
is supported by the research of Harnett, Cwnmings, and Hughes (1968) 
who investigated the effects of risk-taking propensity under varying 
information conditions on bargaining behavior In their study 
bargainers bargained with two other persons since the bargaining was 
between manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. The mean payoffs 
of these bargainers allow some comparisons between bargainers nego-
tiating from different information conditions When all three bar-
gainers of a bargaining trio were completely informed about potential 
payoffs, the differential payoff tended to be more equal than in 
trios where some members of the trio were incompletely informed. 
Differential payoff inequalities seemed to be reduced when all of 
the bargainers in a particular trio were completely informed. If 
pairs where one bargainer has complete information and the other has in-
complete information tend to achieve "non-fifty/ fifty" sph ts in 
differential payoffs, -the question then becomes who w1l l tend to 
receive the more generous portion of the payoff. This question is 
presently unresolved, but hypotheses concerning "bargaining strength" 
propose some answers. 
Bargaining strength has been conceptualized 1n various ways. It 
has been conceptualized has having more 1) physical strength, 
2) intelligence, 3) skill in debate, 4) financial resources, 5) ability 
to sustain financial losses, 6) ability to endure stalemates, and 
7) military power. "Bargaining power has also been described as the 
power to fool and bluff, 'the ability to set the best price for your-
self and fool the other man into thinking this was your best offer. "' 7 
Fellner suggested that bargaining strenth is the ability to take 
and inflict losses during a stalemate, and is "toughness." His con-
8 
ception of toughness was " ... a bargainer's toughness is lus unwilling-
ness to yield in a range in which one party is expected to yield if 
8 the other party fa1ls to do so." 
Kahn and Kohls (1972) have collected evidence that the amount of 
utih ty value 1nfonnat1on bargainers have influences their "bargaining 
toughness." Incomplete information bargainers 1n their study were 
tougher than complete information bargainers according to several 
measures of barga1n1ng toughness. Incomplete information bargainers 
tended to have higher initial goals, make lngher 1111 tial bids, make 
more bids, attempt more deceptions, and take more total time 1n the 
negotiation 
The main hypothesis of Kahn and Kohl's study was that information 
affects bargaining toughness. The study did not hypothesize about 
information affectrng payoffs. Bartos (1970) found barga1111ng toughness 
positively correlated with payoff. Thus, one could reason that in-
complete payoff information increases bargaining toughness, and increased 
bargaining toughness increases payoffs By omitting the intervening 
variable of toughness, one would conclude incomplete information 
increases payoffs. However, Kahn and Kohl's research empirically 
supports the conclusion that incomplete information increases toughness, 
yet simultaneously does not support the conclusion that incomplete 
information increases payoffs. In Kahn and Kohl's study the mean 
payoff for high information bargainers was not significantly higher 
than the mean payoff for low information bargainers. 
In these comparisons by Kahn and Kohls between low information 
bargainers w1 th high information bargainers, 1 t must be noted that 
1n their study the members of a bargaining pair were always in the 
same experimental condition. Consequently, the results concern1ng 
low 1nformat1on bargainers bidding with more toughness than lugh 
1nformat1on bargainers demonstrates little about any bl1rg.11ntn~ 
toughness advantage when an 1ncompletely informed bargainer meets 
a completely informed bargainer. The Kahn and Kohls results concern 
contrasts between pairs of incompletely informed bargainers and pairs 
of completely 1nformed bargainers. 
The Schelling Hypothesis 
"Weakness is often strength," is Schelling's (1960) paradoxical 
9 gu1d1ng pr1nc1ple when cons1der1ng bargaining strength. According 
to Schelling 1t may be advantageous to a bargainer to destroy the 
v1ab1l1ty of the agreements he might be expected to make except for 
those that are extremely desirable to 1nm. Tlns places the burden of 
concession-making on his opponent Since, 1n both appearance (and 
9 
as stressed by Schelling) and in reality he cannot make any concessions, 
h1s opponent must concede 1f they arc to ac1nevc any J 01nt payoff nt 
all. Schelling wrote 
The essence of these tactics 1s some voluntary but 
irreversible sacrifice of freedom of choice. They 
rest on the paradox that the power to constrain an 
adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself, 
that, in bargaining, weakness 1s often strength, 
freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn 
bridges behind one may suffice to undo an opponent. 10 
These conceptions of bargaining strength have a bearing on the 
relationship between utility value knowledge and differential payoff 
because utility value knowledge can affect bargaining strength. 
10 
Although Fellner does hypothesize that differential payoff 1s determined 
11 by the relative bargaining strengths of the buyer and seller, he 
makes no hypothesis relating utility value knowledge to Jdint or 
differential payoff. Siegel and Fouraker have made such a hypothesis 
Using Schelling's "weakness is strength" principle, they hypothesized 
one possible relationship between utility value knowledge and differ-
ential payoff. 
One way in which utility value information can be used as bar-
galn1ng strength 1s that if one knows he 1s 1n a position of strength, 
he will demand the "lion's share" of the Joint payoff. However, if 
one 1s guided by Schelling's "weakness 1s strength" hypothesis, then one 
would predict this may not happen. Using Schelling's hypothesis it 
can be argued that incomplete information of opponent's utility values 
may he advantageous. A bargainer with incomplete information may 
obtain the larger share of the J ornt payoff when bargarnrng with a part-
ner who does have complete 1nformat1on. Tlu.s would be possible 
because the bargainer with complete information realizes that it will 
be difficult for his opponent, who lacks complete 1nformat1on on pay-
offs, to see the merits of the optimal contract. Thus the completely 
informed barga1ner may feel obliged to make large concessions 1n order 
to avoid a stalemate. In such a situation the bargainer with incom-
plete utility function knowledge would win the lion's share of any 
J 01n t profit. 
Beisecker (in an unpublished study) has some evidence that 
bargainers with complete information of both bargainer's payoff 
11 
values receive lugher differential payoff than their incomplete 
information partners. This finding contradicts the Schelling "weakness 
is strenth" approach. This finding also contradicts the nonsignificant, 
but slightly indicative results of Siegel and Fouraker on the effects 
of information on differential payoffs. Siegel and Fouraker wrote 
To test the Schelling hypothesis that bargainers with 
less information will receive the larger share of the 
Joint payoff, the data from the complete-incomplete 
condition were examined ... Although the differences 
are in the direction predicted by Schelling, they are 
not significant.12 
Thus, the Schelling hypothes1.s 1-ias not been supported by experimental 
evidence, however, neither has it been disproved. 
One necessary condition for the Schelling hypothesis to operate in 
this case is awareness by the bargainer with complete information that 
his partner has incomplete payoff information. According to the 
Schelling conception it is the fear that tlus opponent, who does not 
have the complete knowledge of payoffs for both and will consequently 
not see the need for both to make concessions, that causes the complete 
information bargainer to make so many generous concessions. 
What would we expect if we contrasted bargainers with knowledge 
of their opponent's utility functions and with m-.areness that their 
opponent had incomplete knowledge, to bargainers with knowledge of 
their opponent's utility functions who also believed that their 
opponent had such complete payoff information? We are adding a 
dimension to the completeness of 1nfo1mation question. This d11nens1on 
is the awareness of one's opponent's incompleteness of payoff 
information. 
12 
If Schelling's general bargaining principle is true in tlns case, 
then bargainers with complete utility value knowledge who are aware of 
their opponent's incompleteness of utility value information should 
receive less payoff than bargainers who have complete payoff infor-
mation and think their opponents do also. 
Complete Information As A Bargaining Advantage 
Completeness of payoff information might be advantageous, however. 
This might prove true rn several ways. Utility value knowledge might 
cause a bargainer to realize an existing bargaining weakness in an 
opponent. Here bargaining strength would be operationally defined as 
a situation where most of the possible agreements have payoffs strongly 
favoring one bargainer. Thus, the bargainer with complete utility 
value information would be expected to receive a larger share of the 
d1.fferent1al payoff as a result of knowing that the possible payoffs 
favor this likely outcome. 
Another possible way the bargainer with uti Ii ty value information 
might collect an advantageous portion of the Joint payoff is that the 
knowledge of both payoffs could lead to confidence and competence in 
making strategic offers. This confidence and competence could then 
result in an advantage in differential payoff 
The concessions made by one's opponent are an indirect indication 
of whether he "still has room" to make a profit. An incompletely 
informed bargainer might make inferences from his opponent's concessions 
about his opponent's potential payoffs Since, in tlns study and in 
the studies reviewed here, little communication other than the actual 
offers was allowed, messages about what is an equitable profit for 
both or messages about lack of profit if one 1s pre!:>!:>ed for further 
concessions cannot counter any such guesses A completely informed 
bargainer need not make such guesses, and he therefore may have a 
different framewo1~k for Judging the compet1 t1 veness or coopc1 at1 v01w.ss 
of his opponent's concessions. 
Many of the studies on bilateral negotiation have sought to 
clarify contradictory evidence concerning effective concession making 
strategies. Two hypotheses offer distinctly opposite strategies 
the level of aspiration hypothesis and the reciprocity hypothesis. 
Siegel and Fouraker's level of aspiration hypothesis suggests 
that bargaining toughness increases payoffs because overly generous 
concessions cause one's opponent to raise his expectations about his 
probable payoff. Along with Siegel and Fouraker's 1960 study, 
13 
Bartos (1965), Bartos (1966), Kelley (1966), Kelley, Beckman, & Fishcher 
(1967), Liebert, Smith, Keiffer, & Hill (1968), Komorita & Brenner (1968), 
and Rubin & DiMatteo (1972) are cited as providing empirical support 
for the level of aspiration hypothesis. 
The research of Pruitt & Johnson (1970), Komorita & Barnes (1969)' 
Benton et al. (1972) shows support for the reciprocity hypothesis. 
The reciprocity hypothesis states bargainers will concede in accordance 
with the size of their opponent's concession. Generous concessions will 
be generously reciprocated, and small concessions will be minimally 
reciprocated. 
14 
Such studies that are focused on concession making interactions 
during bargaining are relevant to the question of utih ty information 
effects on payoff because some of them consider bilateral bargaining 
pairs where both bargainers have incomplete information (Pruitt & Drews, 
1969, Hinton, Hrunner, & Pohlen, 1974, and Rubin & DiMatteo, 1972) 
Others studied pairs where both bargainers have complete information 
(Druckman et al., 1972, Druckman & Bonoma, 1976, and Michener et al., 
1975). The information state of a bargainer could certainly be an 
important part of the context in wluch a concession 1s Judged to be 
generous or minimal. 
Summary of Previous Research Applied to this Study 
It is clear from the previous studies discussed above that 
completeness or incompleteness of payoff information affects bilateral 
bargaining. Three maJ or principles of such effects are applied to 
the generat1on of this study's hypotheses 
First, when both bargainers have complete payoff information 
they tend to ach1 eve a lngher Joint payoff than incompletely rnformctl 
bargainers. Second, when both bargainers have complete 1nformat10n 
neither tends to get an advantageous share of the payoff. Third, in 
bargaining pairs where one bargainer has complete Jnformation and 
another bargainer has incomplete information, it is presently unknown 
who tends to receive the advantageous share of the payoff. These three 
conclusions lead to the following hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
This study will be concerned with five hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis deals w1 th the following ques t1on. Who tends to acluevc .1 
higher maximization of J 01nt payoff--barga1ning pairs where only one 
of the bargainers is completely informed or bargaining pairs where 
both bargainers are completely informed? The first hypothesis is 
Complete payoff information/complete payoff 1nformat1on 
bargaining pairs will achieve higher J 01nt payoffs than 
will complete payoff 1nformat1on/1ncomplete payoff 
information bargaining pairs. 
This effect of both bargainers having complete payoff 1nformat1on on 
Joint payoff maximization has been supported by Siegel and Fouraker. 13 
15 
The second hypothesis deals with the question of what type of 
bargaining pairs tend to split the possible payoff unequally--barga1ning 
pairs where only one of the bargainers 1s completely informed or 
bargaining pairs where both bargainers are completely informed? The 
second hypothesis 1s 
Complete payoff 1nformat1on/1ncomplete payoff 1nforrnat1on 
bargaining pairs will a.rr1 ve at bargains w1. th greater 
var1ab1l1ty in differential payoffs than complete payoff 
1nformat1on/cornplete payoff information pairs 
14 Siegel and Fouraker's 1960 studies also support this hypothesis 
The tlnrd hypothesis 1s that the "Schelling hypotheSl!, 11 nnght 
explain who tends to obtarn the advantageous share 111 the d1fferent1al 
payoff that is more common in complete payoff 1nformat1on/incompletc 
payoff information pairs. 
:Cn complete payoff rnformation/rncomplctc payoff infor-
mation pairs, the bargainers with incomplete 1nformat1on 
w:i,11 ach.ieve lugher payoffs than their complete 1nformat1on 
opponents. 
Siegel and Fouraker found slightly indicative but nons1gn1f1cant signs 
Of this. ls B k h d h h 1 k 1 16 e1sec er as 1n 1cat1ons tat t e opposite 1s more 1 e y. 
The fourth hypothesis is 
In complete information/incomplete informc1tion pairs, 
complete information bargainers who bargain with 
awareness of the incompleteness of their opponent's 
payoff information will receive lower payoffs than 
complete information bargainers with no awareness 
of the incompleteness of their opponent's payoff 
information 
Siegel and Fouraker's studies did not include a manipulation of 
"awareness of the other's payoff knowledge." Tlns clearc1 test of 
the Schelling hypothesis has not been done. 
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The fifth hypothesis compares two conditions of incomplete payoff 
information. Both of these conditions involved incomplete information 
bargainers who bargain with complete information bargainers. In both 
conditions the complete information bargainers of these pairs are 
unaware of the completeness or incompleteness of their partner's payoff 
information. The incomplete information bargainers represent two 
conditions of awareness of the completeness or incompleteness of their 
partner's payoff information. The payoffs of incomplete information 
bargainers who are aware of their partner's complete payoff information 
will probably be more than the payoffs of incomplete information bar~ 
gainers who are unaware of their partner's complete payoff informdtion. 
The fifth hypothesis is a test of whether or not the bargainer 
with incomplete payoff information who is aware of Ins partner's complete 
payoff information will interpret his partner's concessions as being a 
sign of bargaining weakness, and will consequently yield less. Siegel 
and Fouraker described an instance of a bargainer offering an unex-
17 pectedly generous bid. The opponent's response was not to mdkc a 
reciprocally generous concession, but rather to make even smaller 
concessions than he had been making before the unexpected yielding of 
the other. Siegel and Fouraker speculated that Ins expectations for 
an advantageous bargain had been increased, and resulted in lus 
smaller concession making. The fifth hypothesis is 
Incomplete information bargainers who are aware of their 
partner's complete information will receive lugher payoffs 
than incomplete information bargainers who are less aware 
of their partner's complete payoff information. 
Summary 
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Thus this research posed five maJ or questions regarding the effect 
of payoff information on both Joint and differential payoffs: 
1) What information conditions maximize Joint payoff? 
2) What information conditions lead to inequality in different1al 
payoff? 
3) Do incomplete bargainers or complete bargainers (in 
incomplete/complete pairs) tend to get the advantageous 
share of differential payoff? 
4) Is awareness of one's bargaining partner's incomplete 
information an advantage or disadvantage to a completely 
informed bargainer? 
5) Is awareness of one's bargaining partner's complete infor-
mation an advantage or disadvantage to an 1ncomplctcly 
informed bargainer? 
The procedures used to investigate these research questions are des-
cribed 1.n Chapter II, the results are reported m Chapter I II, and a 
discussion of the results and implications for future research are 
found in Chapter IV. 
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY 
Tlus study used students at the University of Kansas as bargainers. 
The bargainers were randomly assigned to either act ns the buye1 of n 
hypothetical product X or as the seller of X Buyers and sellers were 
randomly paired Each bargaining pair was asked to bargain until an 
agreement as to what quantity of X and at what price X s1'01.1.ld.. be bought 
w~s ~re.d. upcn. In order to manipulate bargainers' states of utility value 
information, bargainers were randomly assigned to one of five conditions 
of different information, and received different payoff information 
accordingly. The bargaining was carried out by having the experimenter 
carry the written price and quantity offers back and forth between the 
buyer and the seller After each bargaining pair reached an agreement, 
the bargainers individually responded to a questionnaire constructed to 
check the manipulation of utility value information as well as the 
bargainers' conceptions of the situation 
SubJects 
The subJects were 120 students who were enrolled in the basic inter-
personal communication course at the University of Kansas. Fifty-nine 
were female and sixty-one were male Almost all 120 were either fresh-
men or sophomores 
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Sub3ects participated in order to fulfill a course requirement to 
either take part in one speech-communication research proJect or to 
review a speech-communication research report Subjects were solicited 
by a bulletin board sign-up sheet This sheet stated to sub3ects that 
they would be taking part in a study of "bargaining communication" In 
terms of assignment to conditions, all such assignment was random. 
Design 
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Five conditions of varying utility value knowledge were used Each 
condition was represented by twelve bargaining pairs. A bargaining pair 
consisted of the buyer and the seller who bargained together Sixty 
bargaining pairs or 120 subjects participated 
Two variables were used to classify the bargaining pairs into five 
different conditions The first was whether both bargainers or only one 
bargainer had complete payoff information in each bargaining pair. In-
complete payoff information bargainers received only a table of their 
own potential profits at various specifications of price and qunnt1ty. 
These tables indicated the various potential profits associated with 
different price and quantity agreements (see Appendices Band C) 
Complete payoff information bargainers received not only a table of 
their own potential profits, but also a table of their bargaining 
opponent's possible profits at various intersections of price and quantity 
The second variable used to class~fy the bargaim.ng pa11 s was 
whether both bargainers, one bargainer, or neither bargainer in a pair 
knew whether his partner had complete or incomplete payoff information. 
This variable was called the awareness of the information state of one's 
bargaining partner. 
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If both bargainers of a bargaining pair had complete payoff infor-
mation and both were aware that the other had complete payoff infor-
mation, then the bargaining pair was said to represent condition one. 
Such bargaining pairs will hereafter be referred to as "complete 
information/complete information" bargaining pairs Only this condition 
had both bargainers using complete payoff information In cond1t1ons 
two, three, four, and five ead1 bargaining pair cons1stc-d of one bar-
gainer with complete payoff information and another bargainer w1 th 
incomplete payoff information 
If one bargainer had complete payoff information and was aware of 
the information condition of the other bargainer, and if this other 
bargainer had incomplete payoff information and was aware of the 
information state of the first, then these two bargainers constituted 
a bargaining pair which represents condition two Such barga1n1ng 
pairs w1ll hereafter be referred to as "complete and aware/incomplete 
and aware" bargaining pairs 
If one bargainer had complete payoff information and was made aware 
of the information state of the other, and if this other bargainer 
had incomplete information and was not made aware of the information 
state of the first, then this bargaining pair represented the third 
condition. Hereafter such pairs will be referred to as "complete and 
aware/incomplete and unaware". 
If one bargainer had complete payoff information and was not made 
aware of the information state of the other, and if this other bargainer 
had incomplete information and was made aware of the information state 
of the first, then these bargainers were a pair which represents 
condition four Such pairs will be called "complete and unaware/incom-
plete and aware" bargaining pairs. 
If one bargainer had complete payoff information and was not made 
aware of the information state of the other bargainer, and 1f this 
other bargainer had incomplete payoff 1nformat1on and was not made 
aware of the information state of the first, then these two bargainers 
constituted a condition five bargaining pair. Such barga1n1ng pairs 
will hereafter be referred to as "complete and unaware/incomplete and 
unaware" bargaining pairs 
Procedure 
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Each experimental session began with the subJects arriving at an 
assigned room. Two bargaining pairs participated 1n each session. The 
first subJect to arrive was directed to a small, windowless, and private 
room. The other subJects on arrival were also directed to private rooms 
-one subJect to each room. It was necessary for each subJect to have 
a private room in order to minimize interpersonal communication between 
the bargainers. 
A random schedule of which conditions were to be represented by 
these two bargaining pairs was followed Inside each condition one 
half of the complete information bargainers acted as sellers and one 
half acted as buyers Likewise, one half of the incomplete information 
bargainers acted as buyers and one half acted as sellers In each pair 
of bargainers a random draw determined who was the buyer and who 
initiated the first offer. 
Each subJect received written instructions (see Appendix A). 
These instructions introduced the bilateral bargaining situation. After 
a few minutes had been allowed for the subJects to read these instruc-
tions, payoff tables and statements or lack of statements about one's 
opponent's payoff tables were given according to the experimental 
condition represented by each subJect (see Appendices Band C) 
Incomplete 1nformat1on was operationally defined as rece1v1ng only 
the seller's table if one was a seller or only the buyer's payoff 
table 1f one was a buyer. Complete 1nformat1on bargainers received 
both the buyer's and the seller's payoff tables 
Awareness of one's opponent's information condition was asswned to 
be low. This was checked w1 th an i tern on the questionnaire and with 
the interview which followed the bargaining session. To make a subJect 
highly aware of the other's payoff knowledge the experimenter told 
what payoff table his opponent was going to be given In cond1 tions 
of unawareness of the other's payoff 1nformat1on the completeness or 
incompleteness of the other's payoff knowledge was not mentioned. 
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Once the subJects knew which of the two roles (buyer or seller) they 
were to play, and had received their payoff table and possibly some 
information about what type of payoff table their opponent had received, 
they were given additional written directions These directions explained 
how to make offers, and what constitutes a bargc11n (see Appendix D). 
Negotiations were conducted in silence A subJect recorded a bid 
on a sheet of paper provided to 1nm for this purpose The subJect then 
signalled the experimenter who took this bid to that subJect's opponent 
The other bargainer then either accepted this offer or made a counter-
offer Both the original offer and all counter-offers were always pas~ed 
along to the bargainers. This continued until the pair came to an agreement. 
TI1e agreed upon bid dictated various amounts of Joint and d1fferent1al 
payoff, and thus served as the maJor dependent variable 1n the various 
statistical analyses 
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Note that this procedure minimized interpersonal relations between 
subJects. The bargainers never saw each other prior to bargaining, and 
they bargained in total physical separation The only communications 
were the offers and the counter-offers This procedure nnn1m1 zed the 
influence of possible incompatibilities or differences 111 verbal style 
when communicating concessions, perceptions, etc. These variables may 
well be important, but they should be minimized when our present concern 
focused on the effects of differences in payoff knowledge. 
After agreements were negotiated, subJects responded to a question-
naire concerning their perceptions of the agreement, the negotiations, 
their expectations of payoffs, their satisfaction with the agreement, 
their awareness of the condition of their opponent's information 
condition, etc. These questions allowed examination of the assumption 
that bargainers who are not told about their partner's information 
condition would not be highly aware of their partner's information 
condition. 
After this written questionnaire was completed by the subJects, 
each subJect was interviewed briefly SubJects were asked not to dis-
cuss the study with anyone. 
Statistical Procedures 
The hypotheses were tested statistically in the following compari-
sons. The first hypothesis was tested with a one-tailed t-test between 
the mean Joint payoff of "complete information/complete 1nformat1on" 
pairs (condition one) against the mean Joint payoff of all other 
pairs (conditions two, three, four and five) It was predicted that 
the mean Joint payoff of complete/complete information pairs would be 
greater than the mean Joint payoff of complete/incomplete pairs. The 
prediction was directional on the evidence of Siegel ls and Fouraker's 
results 18 
If a bargaining pair agreed on a price and quru1titv that gave one 
bargainer a profit of 500 and the other bargainer a profit of 200, then 
the difference in differential payoff would be 300. The second hypo-
thesis was tested with a one-tailed t-test between the mean difference 
in differential payoff of condition one bargaining pairs and the mean 
of conditions two, three, four and five bargaining pairs. It was 
predicted that the mean difference in individual payoffs in condition 
one would be smaller than the mean difference in individual payoffs 1n 
the other conditions where one bargainer has complete information and 
the other bargainer has incomplete information. The prediction was 
19 direct1,onal on the basis of the data of Siegel and Fouraker. 
The third hypothesis was tested with a one-tailed t-test between 
the mean payoffs of complete information bargainers 111 every condition 
except con~ition one and the mean payoffs of incomplete information 
bargainers in all conditions. It WdS predicted that the mean payoff 
of complete information bargainers would be less than the mean payoff 
of incomplete information bargainers Tlus prediction is directional 
20 on the basis of Siegel's and Fouraker's data 
The fourth hypothesis was tested with a one-tailed t-test between 
the mean payoffs of the complete information barga1n1ng in condition 
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three (complete/incomplete pairs where only the complete information 
bargainers are made aware of their partner's state of payoff informa-
tion) versus the mean payoff of the complete information bargainer 
in condition five (complete/incomplete pairs where neither is made 
aware of the condition of payoff 1nformat1on of the other) Tlus test 
was directional on the basis of the speculation of Siegel and Fouraker 
21 and on the basis of Schelling's hypothesis 
The fifth hypothesis was tested statistically with a one-tailed 
t-test between the mean payoff of incomplete bargainers 1n condition 
four (complete/incomplete pairs where only the incomplete information 
bargainer is made aware of the other's condition of 1nformat1on) and 
the mean payoff of incomplete bargainers in condition five (complete/ 
incomplete information pairs where neither is made aware of the 
condition of information of the other) The test was directional based 




Tlns chapter reported the methodological proceclure!:l employed rn 
this research proJect. Specifically, five conditions of varying utility 
value knowledge were created in bilateral bdrgain1ng pairs J\ftc1 
bargaining, subJ ects filled out a questionnaire constructed for tlus 
study to identify any processes related to ut1ll ty value inf ormatlon 
which might have affected the bargaining Of main interest 1n the sta-
tistical analyses were the mean Joint and differential payoff associated 
with the various conditions of utility value information. The results 
of the statistical operations which were used are reported in Chapter III. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
This chapter reports the results of this experimental study. The 
data obtained as well as the statistical analyses are reported for each 
hypothesis. The .05 level of significance was used for all statistical 
tests 
Hypothesis One 
Complete payoff information/complete payoff information 
bargaining pairs will achieve a higher maximization of 
Joint payoff than will complete payoff information/ 
incomplete payoff information bargaining pairs. 
Joint payoff was the sum of each ind1 vi dual bargainer's payoff for the 
agreed upon quantity and price of X, the hypothetical product. Joint 
payoff varied according to the price and quantity agreement of each 
bargaining pair. These variations were specJ.f1ed on the profit tables 
used by the bargainers. The range of possible Joint payoff varied from 
221 profit units to 2,941 profit units. The actual agreements of the 
sixty bargaining pairs of this study created a set of J 01nt pay offs 
which ranged from 600 profit units to 1,080 profit un1.ts 
The mean Joint payoff of the bargaining pairs 1n condition one, 
where both had complete payoff information, was contrasted to the mean 
J 01nt payoff of the bargaining pairs 111 conditions two, three, four, 
and five, where one bargainer had complete payoff information and the 
other bargainer had incomplete payoff information. A one-tailed t-test 
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was performed to determine the extent and significance of the mean 
difference between the two groups. Table 1 reports the means and 
t value of the analysis. 
TABLE 1 

















It was hypothesized that the mean Joint payoff of complete/complete 
information pairs would be higher than the mean J ornt payoff of complete/ 
incomplete information pairs. However, the mean Joint payoff of complete/ 
complete information pairs was not significantly higher than the mean 
Joint payoff of the complete/incomplete information pairs 
hypothesis could not be accepted. 
Hypothesis Two 
Thus, the 
Complete payoff 1nformation/incornplete payoff information 
bargaining pairs wi 11 arrive at bargains with greater 
variability in differential payoff than complete payoff 
information/complete payoff information pairs. 
Differential payoff was each rnd1vi<lual 's payoff for the particular 
agreement on price and quantity negotiated The amount of payoff was 
specified by the profit tables. Since the possible range of individual 
TABLE 2 
JOINT PAYOFF 
Complete Information/ Complete and Aware/ Complete and Aware/ Complete and Unaware/ Completed Unaware/ 
Complete Information Incomplete and Aware Incomplete and Unaware Incomplete and Aware Incompleted Unaware 
Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs 
1080 1055 1030 1030 1023 
1080 1080 1080 865 1080 
1080 947 5 1080 1055 1030 
1023 1030 1080 1050 1080 
1023 1023 1030 1080 1080 
600* 1080 1020 1080 1080 
1080 1080 1023 1030 1080 
1080 1030 1080 1080 865 
1080 1080 1030 1080 1030 
600* 1023 1080 1080 940 
1080 732 5 1080 1080 865 
1080 1080 1080 1051. 5 1080 
Mean 
Joint 990 50 1020 08 1062. 79 1046.79 1019.42 N co 
Payoffs 
*These two pairs achieved a 50%/50% split bargain--apparently without noticing that they could have 
achieved this same 50%/50% parity at another price and quantity which would have been 1080 rather 















-x2 = .825 
TABLE 3 
NUMBER OF PAIRS THAT ACHIEVED THE MAXIMUM 
JOINT PAYOFF OF 1,080 PROFIT UNITS 
Complete/Complete Pairs Complete/Incomplete Pairs 
8 25 
4 23 








NUMBER OF PAIRS THAT ACHIEVED THE MAXIMUM 




5 maximized 8 maximized 
7 did not 4 did not 
41 67% 66.67% 
V 
6 maximized 6 maximized 
6 did not 6 did not 
50 00% 50.00% 
TABLE 5 
AWARENESS AND JOINT PAYOFF 
Source ss df MS F S1gn1f1cance 
Awareness in 
Completely Informed 829.16 1 829 16 0.16 
Bargainer 
Awareness in 
Incompletely Informed 701.50 1 701.50 0.13 
Bargainer 
Interaction 14,717.42 1 14,717 42 2.80 
Error 231,117 .so 44 5,252.67 
Total 247,365.54 47 
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payoff was O profit uni ts to 2,941 profit mn tes, the greatest dis pan ty 
in individual payoff possible was 2,941. If both individuals 1n a pair 
achieved equal individual payoff the minimum difference 1n 111d1vidual 
payoff of zero was achieved The range that actually occurred with this 
study's sixty bargaining pairs was zero profit units to 1,050 profit 
units difference between the payoff of the two bargaining 1n each pair. 
Hypothesis Two, being a directional hypothesis, was exannned w1 th 
a one-tailed t-test of the mean difference in 1ndiv1dual payoff of pa11s 
in condition one versus the mean difference of pairs in cond1t1ons two, 
three, four, and five. It was hypothesized that pairs in condition one 
(the only condition where both bargainers had complete information) 
would have less inequality' rn differential payoff than complete/ 
incomplete information pairs. This hypothesis was accepted since the 
data indicated the mean difference in 1ndiv1dual payoff of condition 
one pairs was significantly less than the mean difference 111 1nd1vidual 
payoff of condition two, three, four and five pairs 
the means and the t value of this analysis. 
Table 6 reports 
TABLE 6 


















THE SIZE OF NONPARITY OF INDIVIDUAL 
PAYOFF WITHIN PAIRS 
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4 7. 5 
180 
231. 67 
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360 c.,.~ c.,.~ 
144.58 
TABLE 8 
NUMBER OF PAIRS THAT ACHIEVED PARITY 
IN INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF 




















NUMBER OF PAIRS THAT ACHIEVED PARITY 




2 achieved pan ty 3 achieved parity 
10 did not 9 did not 
16.67% 25.00% 
V 
1 achieved parity 3 achieved parity 
11 did not 9 did not 
8.34% 25.00% 
TABLE 10 
AWARENESS AND SIZE OF DIFFERENCES IN PAYOFFS 
BETWEEN BARGAINERS OF A PAIR 
Source ss df MS F S1gn1f1cance 
Awareness 1n 
Completely Informed 4,116.26 1 4,116.26 0.08 
Bargainers 
Awareness in 
Incompletely Informed 56,409.80 1 56,409.80 1.06 
Bargainers 
Interaction 107,304.79 1 107,304.79 2 03 
Error 2,330,711.98 44 52,970.73 
Total 2,498,542.83 47 
37 
Hypothesis Two predicted that bargaining pairs where only one 
bargainer has complete payoff information would achieve unequal 1nd1-
vidual payoffs within each such pair. In such pairs one of the two 
bargainers is likely to achieve an advantageous portion of the payoffs. 
Hypothesis Three predicted that 1t would be the incompletely informed 
bargainer rather than the completely informed bargainer who would achieve 
this higher (relative to one's opponent) 1ndiv1dual payoff. 
In the analysis for Hypothesis Three the relative diffe1ences 
Wl thin each bargaining pair between the 1ncomp letely informed bargainer's 
payoff and the completely informed bargainer's payoff were used That 
is, the completely informed bargainer's profit was subtracted from lns 
incompletely informed opponent's profit. For example, a positive 
difference of 120 profit units would indicate that in that bargaining 
pair the incompletely informed bargainer achieved a payoff of 120 
profit units more than the completely informed bargainer's profit. 
The mean difference between incompletely informed bargainer's 
profits and completely informed bargainer's profits across all forty-
eight pairs was 118 64 profit units. 
Hypothesis Three 
In complete payoff information/incomplete payoff information 
pairs, the bargainers with incomplete information will 
achieve higher payoffs than their complete information 
opponents. 
The mean payoff of complete information bargainers was pre<l1cted 
to be less than the mean payoff of their incomplete information 
partners. Since this hypothesis was directional, a one-tailed t-test 
was performed. Table 11 reports the results of the data analysis. The 
hypothesis was accepted as being supported by the data 
TABLE 11 
HYPOTHESIS THREE THE DIFFERENC[ IN INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF 
WITHIN COMPLETE/INCOMPLETE PAIRS 
Means 
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Mean Difference in Individual Payoff 
When the Complete Bargarner's Payoff 
Was Subtracted From the Incomplete 
Bargainer's Payoff 
118.64 profit units 
t = 2.66* 
TABLE 12 
THE ADVANTAGE IN INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF OF THE INCOMPLETELY INFORMED 
BARGAINER RELATIVE TO TI1EITT. COMPLETELY INFORMED OPPONENTS 
Complete and Aware/ Complete and Aware/ Complete and Unaware/ Complete and Unaware/ 
Incomplete and Aware Incomplete and Unaware Incomplete and Aware Incomplete and Unaware 
Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs Bargaining Pairs 
A's B's Differ- A's B's Differ- A's B's Differ- A's B's Differ-
Profit Profit ence Profit Profit ence Profit Profit ence Profit Profit ence 
665 390 275 700 330 370 535 5 494.5 41 693 330 363 
270 810 -540 675 405 270 275 590 -315 540 540 0 
627 5 320 307.5 900 180 720 550 505 45 504 526 - 22 
420 610 -190 540 540 0 1050 0 1050 630 450 180 
550 473 77 210 820 -610 450 630 -180 540 540 0 
540 540 0 607.5 472 .5 135 630 450 180 720 360 360 
540 540 0 550 473 77 770 260 510 540 540 0 
890 140 750 630 450 180 540 540 0 415 450 -35 
675 405 270 700 330 370 720 360 360 630 400 230 
440 583 -143 360 720 -360 720 360 360 530 410 120 
342.5 390 - 47.5 540 540 0 450 630 -180 465 400 65 
!,O 
450 630 -180 540 540 0 761.5 290 471.5 720 360 360 
534.17 485.91 48.26 579.38 483.38 96.00 621. 00 425.79 195.21 577. 25 442.17 135.08 
A is always the Incompletely Informed Bargainer 
TABLE 13 
WHO ACHIEVED THE LARGER PAYOFF IN BARGAINING PAIRS WHERE ONE BARGAINER 
WAS COMPLETELY INFORMED AND THE OTHER WAS INCOMPLETELY INFORMED 
No. of Cases % of All 48 Cases % of the 39 Nonparity Cases 
No advantage to either 
party (parity of individual 
payoff) 
Incompletely informed 
bargainer achieved higher 
payoff than his completely 
informed opponent 
Completely informed 
bargainer achieved higher 
payoff than his incom-
pletely informed opponent 
x2 = 7 .13* 









AWARENESS AND DIFFERENCE IN INDIVIDUAL PAYOFF 
Source ss df MS F Significance 
Awareness in 
Completely Informed 103,834.51 1 103,834.51 1.05 ,--
Bargainers 
Awareness 1n 
Incompletely Informed 459.42 1 459.42 .005 
Bargainers 
Interaction 34,911.04 1 34,911.04 35 
Error 4,343,741.40 44 98,721.39 
Total 4,482,946.37 47 
Hypothesis Four 
In complete information/incomplete information pairs, 
complete information bargainers who bargain w1 th aware-
ness of the incompleteness of their opponent's payoff 
information will receive lower payoffs than complete 
information bargainers with no awareness of the in-
completeness of their partner's payoff information 
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This hypothesis was tested by a comparison of the mean individual 
payoff of complete information bargainers in condition three with the 
mean individual payoff of complete 1nforrnat1on barga1nc1s in conJttton 
five. Results of the one-tailed t-test analysis are reported 111 Table 
15. The data do not support the hypothesis 
TABLE 15 
"AWARENESS" AND "UNAWARENESS" AND COMPLETE 
INFORMATION BARGAINER'S PAYOFFS 













Incomplete information bargainers who are aware of their 
partner's complete information will receive higher payoffs 
than incomplete information bargainers who are less aware 
of their partner's complete payoff information 
This hypothesis predicted that incomplete information bargainers 
who are aware of their opponent's complete information will arrive at 
higher payoffs than incomplete information bargainers who are unaware 
of their opponents information state. This hypothesis was tested with 
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a one-tailed t-test between the mean payoff of incomplete information 
bargainers in condition four versus the mean payoff of incomplete 
information bargainers in condition fl ve. This analysis of the data 
is reported in Table 16. The hypothesis was not accepted. 
TABLE 16 
"AWARENESS" AND "UNAWARENESS" AND INCOMPLETE 
INFORMATION BARGAINER'S PAYOfFS 
N Mean Payoff 
"Aware and Incomplete 12 621. 00 Information" Bargainers 





Hypothesis One dealt with the question of who tends to achieve a 
higher maximization of Jomt payoff--bargaining pairs where only one 
of the bargainers is completely informed or bargaining pairs where both 
bargainers are completely mformed? The prediction tl1<1t "complete/ 
complete information" pairs would achieve higher Joint payoff was not 
supported. 
In regard to Hypothesis Two, the prediction made was supported. 
"Complete/incomplete information" pairs did make bargains with greater 
inequality of differential payoff than "complete/ complete information" 
pairs. 
The Schelling hypothesis, as applied in Hypothesis Three of this 
study, was also supported. 
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Awareness of the information condition of one's bargaining opponent 
did not create significant differences in either Hypothesis Four or 
Hypothesis Five. These two hypotheses dealing with the "awareness" 
manipulation could not be accepted. 




Summary of the Study 
This study investigated the effects of utility value 1nformat1on 
on bilateral bargaining payoffs. One-hundred and twenty university 
students acted as either the buyers or sellers of a hypothetical product 
X. Each bargainer negotiated with either incomplete payoff information 
(which meant knowing only one's own different profit levels at various 
price and quantity intersections) or with complete payoff information 
(which meant knowing both one's own and one's opponent's possible 
profits). A second manipulation used to classify bargainers into 
different conditions was termed the "Awareness" manipulation. If a 
bargainer was informed as to the completeness or incompleteness of his 
opponent's payoff information, then that bargainer was classified as 
"Aware." Unaware bargainers were not informed about their opponent's 
payoff information. The five conditions of varying utility value 
knowledge in a pair of bargainers follows. Condition Onc--"complctc 
and aware/ complete and aware", Condition Two--"complete and aware/ 
1.ncomplete and aware", Condition Three--"complete and aware/incomplete 
and unaware", Condition Four--"complete and unaware/incomplete and 
aware", and Condition Five--"complete and unaware/incomplete and 
unaware". 
These conditions were created for the purpose of exam.unng some 
45 
hypotheses concerning the effects of utility value information on 
bargaining payoffs. These hypotheses will be discussed individually. 
Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis One posed the question of "What utility value infor-
mat1-on cond1.t1ons maximize Joint payoff?" Siegel and Fouraker had 
found that Joint payoff is increasingly maximized in bargaining pairs 
as completeness of payoff 1nfo11nation is 1nc1 ea!:lc<l. Bai g,11n1ng pa1 rs 
where at least one bargainer had complete payoff information usually 
achieved a higher Joint payoff than pairs where ne1ther bargainer had 
complete payoff information. The highest maximization of Joint payoff 
was achieved by pairs where both bargainers had complete payoff rnfor-
mat1on. Siegel and Fouraker concluded there was support for the 
hypothesis that completeness of payoff information results in higher 
Joint payoff maximization. 
Accordingly, this study's hypothesis concerning completeness of 
payoff information and Joint payoff maximization was directional. 
Completeness of payoff information was predicted to result in higher 
Joint payoff. The hypothesis was stated in the following m • .mncr 
Complete payoff information/complete payoff information 
bargaining pairs will aclneve a lughcr maxinnzat1on of 
Joint payoff than will complete payoff 111format10n/rncom-
plete payoff information bargaining pairs 
The mean J ornt payoff of cond1 t1on one pairs was 990. SO pro flt 
units. Rather than being higher than the complete information/ 
incomplete information pairs of conditions two, three, four, an<l five 
this was lower. Complete information/incomplete information pairs 
achieved a mean Jornt payoff of 1037 .26 profit um.ts (see Table 1 for 
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the t value). These means do not support the hypothesis. 
The profit of twelve pairs contributed to the complete 1nformat1on/ 
complete information mean Joint payoff of 990.50 profit units. Two of 
these twelve pairs achieved the lowest Joint payoff of any of the bar-
gaining pairs in any conditions. The mean Joint payoff of complete 
information/1-ncomplete information pairs was 1,037 p1ofi t runts. The 
mean Joint payoff of all the complete information/complete informat10n 
pairs except these two very low-scoring pairs was 1,069. The two low 
scoring pairs in extreme contrast both achieved a mean Joint payoff 
of only 600. Accordingl~ a closer look was taken at the bargaining 
tactics used by these two pairs. 
In trying to understand the distinctly different payoff outcome of 
the two "600 profit units" pairs relative to the other ten pairs of the 
same condition, the initial offers of the bargainers were examined. In 
the case of the two "600" pairs, the initial offers were e:\.treme--that 
is, one party demanded much more than a maJor1ty of the total potential 
profit. The 1n1t1al offers in these two cases created great disparity 
in the differential payoff, the initial offer in one case proposed an 
eighty-eight percent/twelve percent profit split and the other case had 
a hundred percent/zero percent proposed initial payoff split 
If the ini t1al offers in the bargaining of the two "600 profit uni ts" 
pa1.rs were more extreme than the initial offers of the other ten pairs 
in the same condition, eventual compromise would be that much more 
d1.fficult for the two pairs. So, they, in comparison to the other ten 
pairs, might be more easily satisfied with a fifty percent/fifty percent 
split of 600 profit units when further bargaining could have resulted in 
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a fifty percent/fifty percent split of 1,080 profit units. This explan-
ation 1s unsatisfactory though because the proposed initial splits of 
profit of the other two pairs 1n the s arne condition were not less 
extreme than the two "600" pairs five cases of one-hundred percent/ 
zero percent, two ninety-two percent/eight percent cases, one 'eighty-
four percent/ sixteen percent case, and two sixty -seven percent/tlurty-
three percent cases. 
A satisfactory explanation appears to be a combination of two 
factors. As predicted in Hypothesis Two (which was supported by the 
data collected 1n this study) when both bargainers have complete payoff 
information unequal payoff splits occur less often than when one bar-
gainer has incomplete payoff information. Thus, when both bargainers 
have complete payoff information as the two bargaining pairs being dis-
cussed d:i,d, one would expect them to aclueve a bargain with equall ty of 
d1fferent1al payoff. In the bargaining table used, three possible bar-
gains specify such "50/50" splits Two of these possibilities split a 
Joint payoff of 600 profit units equally. TI1e third possible negotiation 
agreement splits a Joint payoff of 1,080 profit units equally. Eight of 
the twelve pairs 1n condition one aclueved the bargain specifying tlus 
"50/50 split--1,080 Joint payoff" bargarn The two low pairs both 
agreed on a "50/50 sph t--600 Joint payoff" bargain. 
Apparently the two low J 01nt profit pans never discovered the 
bargain that would have equality of differential payoff like the bargain 
they agreed on, but additionally would increase the amount they would 
split equally from 600 to 1,080. This explanation is supported by an 
observation. These two might not have d1scovered the 1,080 Joint 
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payoff bargain because they spent less time than the other condition one 
bargaining pairs. They averaged 21. 00 minutes of bargaining wlule the 
other ten condition one pairs bargained for a mean of 27.90 minutes 
In summary, these two pairs significantly lowered the mean Joint payoff 
at condition bargainers. 
As originally hypothesized, condition one bargainers were expected 
to achieve a higher mean Joint payoff, because both bargainers (having 
complete payoff information) would more easily perceive and consider the 
desirable consequence of those possible bargains wlnch maximize Joint 
payoff. Condition two, three, four and five bargainers (where one 
bargainer had incomplete payoff information) were expected to be slightly 
less able to perceive and consider the lugh payoffs of the Joint maximizing 
offers. In this study, however, complete payoff information/complete 
payoff information bargaining pairs did not achieve a significantly 
higher mean Joint payoff than complete payoff information/incomplete 
payoff information pairs. 
Hypothesis Two 
The question posed by Hypothesis Two 1s "What ut11.Lty value infor-
mation conditions tend to result in equality or approximate equality in 
differential payoff and what information conditions tend to result in 
lngher inequality in differential payoff? Siegel and Fouraker had found 
that inequality in differential payoff 1s increased as completeness of 
payoff informati.on is decreased. On the basis of their results tlns 
study' s hypothesis concerning completeness of payoff information and 
inequality in differential payoff was directional. The hypothesis was 
stated as follows. 
Complete payoff information/incomplete payoff information 
bargaining pairs will arrive at bargains w1 th greater 
variability rn differential payoff than complete payoff 
information/complete payoff information pairs. 
This hypothesis was well supported. The mean difference in 
differential payoffs in condition one (38.83 profit units) was signi-
ficantly lower than the mean difference in differential payoffs in 
conditions two, three, four, and f1 ve (235. 40 profit rnu ts) where one 
bargainer had incomplete payoff information (see Table 6 for the t 
value). 
The theoretical explanation for this effect follows. If one of 
the bargainers has incomplete payoff information either the Schelling 
hypothesis or its opposite can take effect, giving one bargainer a 
larger share of the profit. If both bargainers have complete ptiyoff 
information, then they both tend to perceive and demand those offers 
which sph t profit reasonably. When both bargainers hc1ve complete 
payoff information, expected payoff is more realistic So, complete 
payoff information/complete payoff information bargaining pairs more 
easily perceive the middleground compromise areas of the range of 
possible negotiation agreements, tend to expect a payoff as~ociated 
WL th the m1ddleground range, and achieve a bargain that indeed splits 
payoff approximately more equal than complete payoff information/ 
incomplete payoff information pairs. 
Tlu.s theoretical explanation would appear to be supported since 




Hypothesis Two predicted that when one bargaineT of a pair is 
incompletely informed then there is a greater tendency toward incqualtty 
in ind1 vidual payoffs than in bargaining pairs where both bargainers are 
completely informed. That 1s, "large/small" payoff spll ts become more 
common than "fifty/fifty" splits. This hypothesis was strongly supported 
by this study, and has been supported by other studies as reviewed 
earlier. 
Hypothesis Three is an extension of Hypothesis Two. Hypothesis 
Three asked the question of who tends to receive the larger share of the 
payoff--the barga1ner with incomplete payoff information or the bargainer 
with complete payoff information. 
Applying the Schelling hypothesis, it was hypothesized that complete 
payoff infonnation would become bargaining weakness The completely 
informed bargainer's perspective of what bargains constitute a reasonable 
spl1t of potential profit meant the bargainer was provided with his 
opponent's potential profits for every potential bargain. In contrast 
incompletely 1nformed bargainers must make concessions without realistically 
knowing how equitable the bargain is Consequently it is easier for the 
incompletely informed bargarner to bell.eve that he has made suffic1cnt 
concessions and decide that he will give up no more of his profit. Such 
a decision would, of course, lead to payoff 1nequality in favor of the 
incomplete payoff information bargainer. 
This hypothesis was supported (see Table 11 for the t value). The 
mean difference between incompletely informed bargainers' profits and 
their completely informed opponent's profits was 118.64 profit units 
in favor of the incompletely informed bargainers. Hypothesis Four and 
Five further explore the relative advantages of complete versus in-
complete utility value information. 
Hypotheses Four and Five 
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Hypotheses Four and five are concerned with the effects of aware-
ness of one's opponent's condition of payoff infonnation on differential 
payoff. Hypothesis Four predicted that to a completely rnfomed bar-
gainer the knowledge of one's opponent's incompleteness of payoff 
information would result in lower payoff for that bargainer. The 
hypothesis was stated in the following form. 
In complete information/incomplete information pairs, 
complete information bargainers who bargain with awareness 
of the incompleteness of their opponent's payoff information 
will receive lower payoffs than complete information 
bargainers with less awareness of the incompleteness of 
their opponent's payoff infonnation 
As Table 15 shows, the analysis failed to achieve statistically signifi-
cant support for the hypothesis. Theoretically, the effect was expected 
on the basis that to a completely informed bargainer, awareness of the 
incompleteness of one's opponent's payoff 1nfonnation should act as a 
heightening of the Schelling effect. That is even more of the burden of 
concession making should have theoretically been placed on the completely 
informed bargainer 
To an incompletely infonned bargainer, awareness was expected to 
have an advantageous effect. The reasoning follows. If an incompletely 
informed bargainer was aware that the offers of the completely informed 
bargainer were being made by the completely informed bargainer on the 
basis of both their prof 1. ts, then he nught wonder why tlns completely 
informed bargainer is making concessions that give him profit. 1nis 
might lead to the inference that the completely informed bargainer 15 
bargaining from a position of weakness TI1at is, "aware" incompletely 
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informed bargainers may interpret opponent's concessions as generous 
considering that those opponents know both bargainers possible profits, 
and yet are still offering concessions. Such an a3sumpt1on that their 
opponents are Just salvaging their own possible p1ofits from n known 
weak bargaim.ng position would cause the ''aware and incompletely 
informed" bargainer to yield less. 
The hypothesis was stated in the following form 
Incomplete information bargainers who are aware of their 
partner's complete infonnation w111 rcce1 vc higher payoffs 
than incomplete information bargainers who are less aware 
of their partner's complete payoff information 
As Table 16 shows, the support for the hypothesis was not stat1 stically 
significant. 
Implications 
Two of the hypotheses were supported--Hypothes1s Two and Hypothesu 
Three. The Hypothesis Two support agreed with other studies that when both 
barga1ners have complete payoff information, differential payoff 
inequality 1s reduced. The support for Hypothesis Three 1.s also impor-
tant. Prior to this study the question of whether there is a profit 
advantage for complete information bargainers or for incomplete info1-
mat1.on bargainers was dealt with by few studies, the conclusions were 
confhctl.ng. This study provided statistically s1g111f.1cd11t support for 
the Schelling hypothesis. 
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In the current research on bilateral bargaining, two theoretical 
positions appear to be developing. One is guided by Siegel and Fouraker's 
Level of Aspiration hypothesis. This theoretical position suggests that 
concession makJ.,ng is governed by a bargainer's expectations of what a 
fair bargain will mean in tenns of his share of the profit. Thus an 
opponent's concessions are primarily Judged relative to a "pre-initial 
offer" aspiration level. Tho roc1proc1ty po!,it1on ~ugg0!:--t" thnt tho stw 
of an opponent's recent concession or concessions best predicts the 
bargainer's answering concession. 
Th1s study seems to fit rnto the Siegel and Fouraker position. In 
this study the completeness of one's utility value information is thought 
to play a maJor role in the setting of realistic (and, in consequence, 
lower) levels of aspiration. The implication for future studies is that 
this can be tested in future studies by attempts to measure initial 
expected payoff and perhaps even fluctuations in level of aspiration 
during the bargaining. 
One of the obvious limitations to generalizing the results of this 
study to other conflict of interest situations is that the monetary incen-
t1. ves of the bargainers were purely hypothetical They bargained with 
enthusiasm for only hypothetical profits 
The results of this study would certainly be expected to be different 
if one of the basic cundi tions of the study was al tered--that of llm1 ted 
communication. In this study, the only communication between bargainers 
was the written exchange of economic offers. Bargainers could not comment 
to their opponents about offers, they could only make further offers. 
The limited communication prevented bargainers from communicating 
information to their opponents about how to 1ntorp1et .my part1culur 
concession. The bargainers could not say, "Tius is my last offer", or 
"I cannot concede any lower because then my prof1 t is rid1 culous ly 
'.small." Allowing such communication about how to interpret an offer 
would negate the Schelhng effect. Completely informed bargainers 
would quickly inform those of their rncompletely informed opponents 
with unrealistic payoff expectations about the inequity of their 
unrealistic offers. 
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Less restricted communication would have a direct bearing on the 
Schelling hypothesis. When one bargainer has only limited knowledge of 
the other's utility values, communication can be employed to make the 
completeness of payoff information more two-sided. Such commum,cations, 
I 
however, would raise another issue. Would such "information" be believed 
in the context of the partly competi t1ve s1.tuation of bilateral barga1111ng? 
Beisecker has noted two prrnciples of relevance here. 1) the potential 
impact of commun1cat1on is greater in bargaining situations with less 
23 initial structure , and 2) communication can be used cooperatively or 
24 competitively. In regard to these two principles, incompleteness of 
information would mean a less definite 1n1t1al structure which would 
mean communication could have greater impact. However, would the 
completely informed bargainer's communications about his utility values 
to his less informed opponer.t be perceived as cooperative or cornpet1t1ve? 
In terms of a practical example how often would potential car buyers 
with incomplete payoff knowledge believe the car salesman when he says, 
"I JUSt would not be making any commission at all if I went that low in 
price." 
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Along w1 th the research issue of the cred1b1h ty of commun1cat1ons 
designed to make an incompletely informed bargainer completely informed, 
there is the research area of how are such communications attempted. 
Studies focusing on the possible ways completely 1nformed bargainers 
try to inform incompletely informed opponents are needed. 
Bilateral bargaining researchh~5o~exhausted all potential questions. 
Hopefully, the variable of completeness of utility value 1nfo11nation can 




Tlus is a research proJect interested in the process of bargaining. 
We are interested m what krnds of offers and counteroffers lead to 
bargains advantageous to a buyer or advantageous to a seller. We are 
interested in whether you can aclueve a bargain advantageous to you. 
You will be randomly paired with another student in one of the 
other rooms. You will be selected to act as either the seller or the 
buyer or "X". Your bargaining opponent in the other room will act as 
the buyer of X if you are the seller, or w1ll act as the seller of X 
if you are the buyer. A coin flip will determine who will be the buyer 
and who will be the seller. 
You will be supplied with a table showing various profit levels 
you can attain, and the prices and quantities to be agreed upon in order 
to reach those levels of profit. The seller's table is derived from 
his costs and reflects the condition that his profits vary directly 
with price. The buyer's table is derived from what he can distribute 
pro fl. tably, and therefore varies inversely with price. To t1ns extent 
your interests are opposed, that 1s, the seller wants to sell at a high 
price, and the buyer wants to buy at low prices. However, an agreement 
as to price and quantity must be reached 1f you are to realize any 




1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Your Profit 
230 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
220 17 30 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
210 27 60 65 so 0 0 0 0 0 
200 38 90 115 120 90 33 0 0 0 
190 47 120 165 190 180 143 91 0 0 
180 57 150 215 260 270 253 221 150 51 
170 67 130 265 330 360 363 351 300 221 
160 77 210 315 400 450 473 481 450 391 
150 87 240 365 475 540 583 611 600 561 
140 97 270 415 540 630 693 741 750 731 
130 107 300 465 610 720 803 871 900 901 
120 117 330 515 680 810 913 1001 1050 1071 
110 127 360 565 750 900 1023 1131 1200 1241 u, (X) 
(continued next page) 
APPENDIX B (CONTINUED) 
Price 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
100 137 390 615 820 990 1133 1261 1350 1411 
90 147 420 665 890 1080 1243 1391 1500 1581 
80 157 450 715 960 1170 1353 1521 1650 1751 
70 167 480 765 1030 1260 1463 1651 1800 1921 
60 177 510 815 1100 1350 1573 1781 1950 2091 
50 187 540 865 1170 1440 1683 1911 2100 2261 
40 197 570 915 1240 1530 1793 2041 2250 2431 
30 207 600 965 1310 1620 1903 2171 2400 2601 
20 217 630 1015 1380 1710 2013 2301 2550 2771 




1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
Your Profit 
230 220 600 900 1120 1260 1320 1300 1200 1020 
220 210 570 850 1050 1170 1210 1170 1050 850 
210 200 540 800 980 1080 1100 1040 900 680 
200 190 510 750 9-10 990 990 910 750 510 
190 180 480 700 840 900 880 780 600 340 
180 170 450 650 770 810 770 650 450 170 
170 160 420 600 700 720 660 520 300 0 
160 150 390 550 630 630 550 390 150 0 
150 140 360 500 560 540 440 260 0 0 
140 130 330 450 490 450 330 130 0 0 
130 120 300 400 420 360 220 0 0 0 
120 110 270 350 350 270 110 0 0 0 
0\ 
180 0 0 0 
0 
110 100 240 300 280 0 
~t1nued next page) 
APPENDIX C (CONTINUED) 
Price 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 
100 90 210 250 210 90 0 0 0 0 
90 80 180 200 140 0 0 0 0 0 
80 70 150 150 70 0 0 0 0 0 
70 60 120 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60 50 90 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 40 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
62 
APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR BIDDING 
You have before you a table of numbers. Across the top of the 
table are various quantities of X, along the left-hand side of the table 
are listed various prices of X. The numbers in the body of the table 
represent the profits associated with various combinations of price 
and quantity. 
The following steps outline the procedure of the bargaining· 
1. One of each pair of bargainers w1ll be randomly selected (by com flip) 
to start the bargaining. 
2. Your respective bids should be in terms of both price and quantity. 
3. You might want to start bargaining from a posi t1on wlnch is quite 
favorable to you, since you may have to make concessions to reach an 
agreement. 
4. You must either accept the offer of the other party, or make a counter-
offer until an agreement is reached. 
5. Bargaining is done in good faith (1.e, any bid offered by you at 
any time and turned down by your rival may be subsequently accepted 
by him). 
6. Your offer 1s made by writing a price and quantity bid only on 
available s11.ps of paper. 
7. The prof1. t table shows some possible pn.ces and quan1. ti ties, however, 
you are perm1tted to use values not given in the table. If you choose 
a pr1.ce and/or quantity in between two values shown on the table, then 
then the prof1t will be between those profits shown 
APPENDIX E 
A QUESTIONNAIRE ABOUT YOUR BARGAINING 
1. What price and quantity did you agree upon? 
2. What was your profit? 
3. To what extent did you detennine the outcome? 
1 2 
I had notlnng 
to do with 
the outcome 
4. To what extent 
1 2 
He had nothing 
to do with the 
outcome 















3 4 s () 
did your bargaining opponent determine 
3 4 5 6 
were you competitive? 
3 4 5 6 
was your partner competitive? 
3 4 5 6 
did you make reasonable bids? 












I was extremely 
non-competitive 
7 
He was extremely 
non-competitive 
7 
1 made extremely 
unreasonable bids 





3 4 5 6 
9. What payoff did you expect before you started biddrng? 
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7 
He made extremely 
unreasonable bids 
10. What payoff did your partner expect before you started bidding? 




a great deal 












enJoy the bargaining? 
4 5 6 
satisfied with the agreement 
4 5 6 
7 





I am extremely 
dissatisfied with it 
13. Briefly describe your understanding of the situation. 
14. Briefly describe your own profit table. 
15. Briefly describe your partner's profit table. 
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16. Did understanding either the situation, your own profit table, 
or your partner's profit table help you make a profitable bargain? 
If so, briefly note why. 
17. What would you have liked more information about to help you 
achieve a profitable bargain? 
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